Delegation and Defensive Legislative Strategies in Brazil

Bibliographic Data

ID6300764
AuthorsSylvia Gaylord (Colorado School of Mines, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume35
Issue1
Pages5-30
Publication date2010-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.3162/036298010790821969
OpenAlexW2057905413
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited21

In the course of the legislative process, legislators choose how much policy discretion to delegate to the executive branch. Uncertainty about policy outcomes and bureaucratic intentions weighs heavily in such decisions. In Brazil, executive control over the budget creates uncertainty about the availability of discretionary spending, which results in comparatively high levels of delegation in the legislature's direct‐spending decisions. I demonstrate that sidelining the legislature from the budget in order to insulate government spending from political pressures diminishes the value of legislative work in Brazil and reinforces historical patterns of policymaking centered on the federal executive

Budget process · Bureaucracy · Delegate · Delegation · Discretion · Economics · Executive branch · Government (linguistics · Legislature · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration · Finance

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