Don't Sweat the Details! Enhancing Congressional Committee Expertise Through the Use of Detailees
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300767 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Russell W Mills (Bowling Green State University, corresponding author), Jennifer L Selin (0000-0002-4018-6159, University of Missouri, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 611-636 |
| Publication date | 2017-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12171 |
| OpenAlex | W2615294610 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 27 |
In contrast to the dramatic growth in the size and influence of the executive branch over the past 40 years, congressional committee staffing levels are at an all‐time low. Faced with growing demands to produce legislation and to conduct oversight of executive branch policymaking, Congress can and does supplement its existing staff by borrowing personnel, known as detailees, from federal agencies. Using an original dataset of detailees from 1997 to 2015, we analyze the degree to which congressional committees rely on detailees to increase legislative capacity. We find that committees in the House and Senate use detailees in different ways to further both legislative and oversight initiatives
Executive branch · House of Representatives · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Staffing · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Partisanship and congressional intelligence oversight
The Headless Fourth Branch
The Traceability of Presidential Policymaking in the Face of Congressional Sanctioning
Keeping tabs on the executive
Bureaucratic responsiveness in times of political crisis
Deconstructing the Administrative State
Groups as Lawmakers
Problem Solving and the Demand for Expert Information in Congress
Polarization and the Ties That Bind
Amending Ethics Committee Sanction Recommendations in the House of Representatives
Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving
Congressional Government
Committees in Congress
Information and Legislative Organization
Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making
Legislating in the Dark
Learning While Governing
The Business of America is Lobbying
Deliberate Discretion?
The Political Economy of Expertise
Congress, The Electoral Connection
What Happens After the Alarm? Interest Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers
Congressional dysfunction
Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-Nominate Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap
Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap
Retrospective Congressional Oversight and the Dynamics of Legislative Influence over the Bureaucracy
Career Dynamics of Congressional Legislative Staff
Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Congressional Legislative Staff
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Explaining Congressional Staff Members’ Decisions to Leave the Hill
Buying Expertise
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |