Strategic Voting in Multi‐Office Elections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300803 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Peres (0000-0002-6732-0733, University of Rochester, corresponding author), Michael Peress |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 619-642 |
| Publication date | 2008-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298008786403060 |
| OpenAlex | W2091938132 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 31 |
What are the incentives for voters to vote strategically when legislative policy outcomes are constrained by a system of checks and balances? The policy‐balancing theory supposes that moderate voters split their tickets because such splitting is the only way these voters can achieve moderate policy outcomes. I show that a different type of strategic voting, policy stacking, is characteristic of legislatures that endow the majority party with only limited institutional powers. Focusing on voting for the president and House of Representatives in the United States reveals that a substantial proportion of voters engage in policy‐stacking behavior, but very few engage in policy‐balancing behavior
Business · Economics · Incentive · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Setting the Agenda
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
A Unified Theory of Party Competition
A Theory of Divided Government
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees
A simple direction model of electoral competition
The Puzzle of Midterm Loss
Split-Ticket Voting
Optimal Supermajority Requirements in a Two-Party System
Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model
Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting
Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock
Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR
Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers
Strategic Voting in Britain
Vote Choice and the Preference for Divided Government
Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study
The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting
A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections
"Sophisticated" Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries
Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections
Ideological Consensus Within Divided Party Government
Measuring strategic voting
Loss aversion, presidential responsibility, and midterm congressional elections
Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law
A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting
Coordination and Policy Moderation at Midterm
When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,18 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |