Bicameralism and Geographic Politics
Allocating Funds in the House and Senate
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301033 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Frances E Lee, Frances Lee (0000-0002-9857-7494, Case Western Reserve University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 185-213 |
| Publication date | 2004-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298004x201140 |
| OpenAlex | W2009683656 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
| References cited | 35 |
Because they represent different kinds of constituencies—states versus parts of states—senators and House members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized benefits, House members need to use policy tools—earmarks and narrow categorical programs—that target funds to their constituencies. Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money. Examining House‐Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts
Business · Categorical variable · Distributive property · Economics · Federal funds · House of Representatives · Incentive · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Representation (politics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Finance
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| Unique citing works | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,3 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 26 |