Appointment Politics and the Ideological Composition of the Judiciary

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6301035
AutoresEdward H Stiglitz (Cornell Law School, autor de correspondencia)
Año2014
Volumen39
Número1
Páginas27-54
Fecha de publicación2014-02-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/lsq.12032
OpenAlexW2101462648
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas18

Scholars have advanced a wide range of theories regarding the role of Senate confirmation in judicial appointments. In this article, I directly test the predictions of these models using a novel measure of the ideology of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The main results indicate that the filibuster and majority party have predominated in appointment politics. Prompted by recent events, I also conduct a simulation‐based exercise to examine the ideological composition of the judiciary under a confirmation regime in which the filibuster is not present. This exercise suggests that the Senate filibuster induces moderation in judicial appointments; the elimination of the filibuster is likely to result in a more contentious, if less dilatory, confirmation process and a more polarized judiciary

Ideology · Moderation · Political science · Politics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology