Parties, Coalitions, and Cleavages

A Comparison of Two Legislatures in Two French Republics

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6301476
AutoresDavid Wood (0000-0003-1505-3562), David M Wood (0000-0002-9724-7733), Jack T Pitzer
Año1979
Volumen4
Número2
Páginas197
Fecha de publicación1979-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/439460
OpenAlexW2312682820
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas11

Parallel Guttman scale analyses of cabinet-formation and cabinet-termination votes in two French legislatures (1932-1936 and 1951-1955) reveal more differences than similarities in coalition patterns. In both legislatures the center served as the anchorpoint for coalitions, but the reliable center was larger and more cohesive in the later legislature. Party cohesion was greater in 1951-1955 than in 1932-1936. These differences suggest that new patterns of French legislative behavior that surfaced only in the Fifth Republic may already have been developing in the Fourth Republic; these patterns are greater party cohesion and greater dependability of parliamentary majorities

Economics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law