Offending the One Percent
Seven Arguments Against Distributive Desert
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6308992 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tom Malleson (0000-0003-3708-7907, Social Justice & Peace Studies, King’s University College, Western University, London, Canada, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 178-200 |
| Publication date | 2016-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | New Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0739-3148 • E-ISSN: 1469-9931 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1080/07393148.2016.1153188 |
| OpenAlex | W2296880386 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
The belief that people morally deserve the income they acquire in the market is both powerful and deep-rooted. Nevertheless, most political philosophers are skeptical of the idea that market income is morally deserved. There is thus a large and uncomfortable chasm between the philosophical mainstream and the actual public. The purpose of this article was to inject new intellectual effort in closing this gap. The goal is the ambitious one of a comprehensive demolition of the notion of distributive desert. To this end, I put forward seven critical arguments. Four of them are common in the literature. Since these have been adequately discussed elsewhere, I mention them here briefly and only for completeness. The core of the article focuses on three original arguments. Overall, my aim is to show that, taking these arguments together, the case against distributive desert is conclusive
Desert (philosophy · Distributive property · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mainstream · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Skepticism · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2024 (7) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |