Implementing Public Accounts Committee Recommendations
Evidence from the UK Government’s ‘Progress Reports’ since 2012
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6310713 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas Elston (0000-0001-6659-7928, University of Oxford, corresponding author), Yuxi Zhang (0009-0006-4190-5393, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 662-693 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Parliamentary Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-2290 • E-ISSN: 1460-2482 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pa/gsab068 |
| OpenAlex | W4205181578 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 43 |
The Public Accounts Committee is the oldest and, reputedly, most influential oversight committee in the British parliament. Since 2012, the government has published an unprecedented volume of data explaining its actions in response to the PAC’s inquiries. By tracking all 615 of the Committee’s recommendations from 2010 to 2012 across the first 14 of these ‘progress reports’, we explore how effectively this novel reporting mechanism serves to inform parliament about the executive’s responsiveness to scrutiny. We find the reports to yield rich data on the fate of many individual recommendations, but only limited information on the overall timeliness and quality of implementation. Flexibilities and inconsistencies in reporting style also make the arrangements vulnerable to gaming. We identify potential improvements and research opportunities
Business · Government (linguistics · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Quality (philosophy · Scrutiny · Sociology · Tracking (education · Accounting · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
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| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1.25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |