Parties as Programmatic Agents

A Test of Institutional Theory in Brazil

Bibliographic Data

ID6314554
AuthorsMona Lyne (0000-0002-2853-996X, University of South Carolina, corresponding author), Mona M Lyne (University of South Carolina)
Year2005
Volume11
Issue2
Pages193-216
Publication date2005-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueParty Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1354-0688 • E-ISSN: 1460-3683
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1354068805049776
OpenAlexW2171800877
LanguageEN
Citations received23
References cited18

The received wisdom in the study of Brazilian parties holds that Brazilian electoral law precludes programmatic parties. Yet we have little comprehensive data on party behavior in Brazil, and the electoral law thesis of party weakness has never been directly tested. I test the theory by examining party behavior in two periods of democratic rule (1945–64 and 1989–2002) in which electoral law is constant. I examine several features of governing and opposition coalition behavior, including inter-coalition divisiveness and intra-coalition unity in legislative voting, and party alliances in legislative elections and governing cabinets. All three indicators demonstrate more programmatic behavior in the current period, despite the constancy of electoral law. The results indicate that Brazilian parties are more coherent collective actors than previously recognized, and that scholars must augment institutional analysis with other variables in order to develop a general theory of party behavior

Democracy · Law and economics · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America

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