Legislative organization in MMP
The case of New Zealand
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6315014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kuniaki Nemoto (0000-0002-3117-2775, University of British Columbia), Robert Pekkanen (University of Washington), Robert J Pekkanen (0000-0002-4634-0954, University of Washington), Ellis S Krau (0000-0002-9632-1372, University of California, USA), Nigel S Roberts (Victoria University of Wellington) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 503-521 |
| Publication date | 2012-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Party Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-0688 • E-ISSN: 1460-3683 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354068810389634 |
| OpenAlex | W2128414927 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 12 |
How do electoral systems affect legislative organization? The change in electoral systems from Single Member District plurality (SMD) to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) in New Zealand can illuminate how electoral incentives affect the distribution of cabinet positions. Because in SMD the outcome of individual local districts determines the number of seats a party wins collectively, New Zealand parties deploy cabinet posts in order to shore up the electoral fortunes of individual members. In MMP, the total number of seats a party receives is determined by the votes in the proportional representation (PR) portion for the party, which eliminates the incentives to reward electorally unsafe members with cabinet positions. We show that strong cabinet members, measured through experience as prior terms in the cabinet position, are still likely to be retained
Business · Cabinet (room · Economics · Electoral system · Geography · Incentive · Legislature · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Proportional representation · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · New Zealand Economic and Social Studies · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Information and Legislative Organization
Making Votes Count
Clarify
Mixed-Member Electoral Systems
Patterns of democracy
The positive theory of legislative institutions
The New Zealand Constitution
How Much Change
Effective” Number of Parties
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,31 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2016 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |