Electoral incentives to coalition formation in multiparty presidential systems

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6315714
AutoresAndré Borges (0000-0002-2129-8091, Universidade de Brasília, autor de correspondencia), Mathieu Turgeon (0000-0003-0134-4027, The University of Western Ontario, Canada), Adrián Albala (0000-0002-0444-2952, Universidade de Brasília)
Año2021
Volumen27
Número6
Páginas1279-1289
Fecha de publicación2021-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaParty Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1354-0688 • E-ISSN: 1460-3683
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1354068820953527
OpenAlexW3082010910
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17
Referencias citadas32

Coalition theories of presidential regimes have frequently assumed that coalition formation is a mostly post-electoral phenomenon. We challenge this view by showing that pre-electoral bargaining shapes to a substantial extent minority presidents’ disposition to cooperate with the legislature by forming a majority cabinet. Examining a dataset of pre- and post-electoral coalitions from 18 Latin American countries, we find that majority coalition cabinets are more likely to occur when elected presidents form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs), to the extent that pre-electoral agreements create stronger incentives for cooperation, by relying on a broader set of rewards than any post-electoral agreement. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of majority coalition formation increases as the share of PEC seats increases, thus reducing the need to engage in post-electoral bargaining. Our findings carry important implications for the study of cabinet formation in presidential regimes by introducing pre-electoral agreements as a key determinant of cabinet formation

Cabinet (room · Democracy · Economics · Electoral reform · Electoral system · Incentive · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Proportional representation · Public economics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies