Rethinking coalition size and trade policies in authoritarian regimes
Are single-party dictatorships less protectionist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6315839 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Wen-Chin Wu (0000-0002-3229-4619, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 143-153 |
| Publication date | 2020-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Party Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-0688 • E-ISSN: 1460-3683 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354068817752517 |
| OpenAlex | W2783666820 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 37 |
Recent studies find that single-party dictatorships are more open to trade due to their larger coalitions than other types of dictatorships. However, this line of research assumes that the preference for trade policies is homogeneous among members of the coalition. This assumption means existing studies fail to explain why single-party dictatorships have more dispersed and complex tariffs rates, an alternative form of protectionism. In this article, I argue that the heterogeneous preferences for free trade among social groups lead to tariff complexity under dictatorships with large coalitions. When dictators need to build larger coalitions, they do not need to exclude all special interest groups but to respond to heterogeneous demands of trade policies in a more selective way. Thus, politicians under single-party dictatorships are more likely to set ad hoc tariffs to favor different members in their coalitions, resulting in complex tariff schedules
Authoritarianism · Democracy · Dictatorship · Economics · Homogeneous · International economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Protectionism · Tariff · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |