Revising Rules, Shifting Schemas
Toward an Expanded Formal Account of Norm Change
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6325506 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Justin P Bruner (0000-0001-7845-8079, Department of Philosophy University at Buffalo Buffalo New York USA), Justin Bruner (0009-0005-8090-3393, University at Buffalo, State University of New York), Ryan Muldoon (0000-0002-7269-6209, Department of Philosophy University at Buffalo Buffalo New York USA) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 333-343 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/papa.70003 |
| OpenAlex | W4412514715 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 30 |
Norms hold a central role in social philosophy, with Cristina Bicchieri's game‐theoretic approach being one of the most influential accounts. Bicchieri's framework has inspired numerous successful interventions, improving outcomes across diverse communities worldwide. However, certain aspects of Bicchieri's theory remain underdeveloped, limiting its ability to predict the best strategies for norm change. To address this, we present a simple formal model that clarifies the relationship between key components of her theory—schemas and behavioral rules—offering theorists and practitioners new tools for modeling and measuring social and behavioral change
Law and economics · Norm (philosophy · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Religion and Society Interactions · Social Psychology
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
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Explaining Norms
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Evolutionary stability of reciprocity in a viscous lattice
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |