Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6325531 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nicolas Cornell (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 109-143 |
| Publication date | 2015-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/papa.12054 |
| OpenAlex | W1858158791 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 29 |
| References cited | 1 |
In philosophical and legal arguments, it is commonly assumed that a person is wronged only if that person has had a right violated. This assumption is often viewed almost as a necessary conceptual truth: to be wronged is to have one's right violated, and to have a right is to be one who stands to be wronged. I will argue that this assumption is incorrect—that having a right and standing to be wronged are distinct and separable moral phenomena.\nMy argument begins from cases in which third parties are affected by the violation of someone else's rights. I will introduce four general types of cases in which some third party seems to be wronged even though no right of hers is violated. These cases arise because we have important commitments and practices associated with having a right and with being wronged—commitments and practices that do not always line up with one another. Only by recognizing that rights and wrongings can come apart, I argue, can we preserve the roles that both moral phenomena play in our lives.\nIn addition to more accurately capturing our moral lives, I also believe that this recognition may be philosophically fruitful. It may add a new layer to recent work on the directedness of moral obligations. It may offer a path forward in the stalled debate between interest theories and will theories over the nature of rights. And, practically speaking, I believe that it can safeguard against certain common and tempting yet problematic inferences
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Immigration and Discrimination
The Rights Network
Bound by Convention
Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual
Morality and Socially Constructed Norms
Digital Self-Defence
Against the Entitlement Model of Obligation
Beyond Normative Control
Wrongs Without Rights
Mistreating Consent
Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven
Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence
Moral rights without balancing
What is morality
‘I didn't know it was you’
By Convention Alone
The Value of Uptake
Promises, Commitments, and the Nature of Obligation
The Fair Share Theory of Conventional Normativity
Reverse‐engineering Blame 1
Rethinking moral claim rights
Property and Authority
Debate
What does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action
The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving
Two concepts of directed obligation
Relational Primitivism
Social constraints on sexual consent
Corrective Duties/Corrective Justice
| Unique citing works | 29 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,22 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 29 |