Moral Grandstanding

Kurt Baier wrote that “moral talk is often rather repugnant. Leveling moral accusations, expressing moral indignation, passing moral judgment, allotting the blame, administering moral reproof, justifying oneself, and, above all, moralizing—who can enjoy such talk?”1 When public moral discourse is at its best, we think that these features (if they are present at all) are unobjectionable. But we also think that, to some degree, Baier is right: public moral discourse—that is, talk intended to bring some matter of moral significance to the public consciousness—sometimes fails to live up to its ideal. Public moral discourse can go wrong in many ways. One such way is a phenomenon we believe to be pervasive: moral grandstanding (hereafter, “grandstanding”).2 We begin by developing an account of grandstanding. We then show that our account, with support from some standard theses of social psychology, explains the characteristic ways that grandstanding is manifested in public moral discourse. We conclude by arguing that there are good reasons to think that moral grandstanding is typically morally bad and should be avoided. Whatever else is true about the nature of morality, its real-world efficacy depends a great deal upon the practice of public moral discourse. The ability to discuss effectively matters of moral concern with other people is an indispensable tool both for interpersonal dealing and promoting moral improvement. One might expect to find universal reverence for such an important practice. At minimum, one would expect people to use the tools of moral talk carefully, so that they remain effective. But Baier's complaint about the repugnance of some moral talk strikes a chord, which suggests that public moral discourse is not living up to its ideal. That moral talk sometimes goes wrong should be a matter of serious concern. When moral talk is repugnant, it may be bad for the practice of public moral discourse. It may be disrespectful to others to abuse the practice for the promotion of one's own interests. And it may speak ill of the character of the person engaging in repugnant moral talk. In short, moral talk itself can become a form of bad behavior. This article examines moral grandstanding, one prominent form of repugnant moral talk, and considers its moral implications. For most readers, charges of moral grandstanding are familiar. Especially in contemporary politics, where healthy public discourse is vital, accusations of grandstanding are hard to miss. For example, on July 11, 2013, the US Senate opened up debate on new efforts to enact comprehensive immigration reform. In anticipation of the public discourse to follow, the American Immigration Council released a statement the same day, urging that “evidence, rather than grandstanding and rhetoric, should drive the debate on the Senate floor.”3 And Donald Trump's 2016 US presidential campaign website included the line “We need real solutions to address real problems. Not grandstanding or political agendas.”4 We take it, however, that senators and presidential candidates are not the only ones liable to grandstand. Despite its being almost universally derided, grandstanding is a common occurrence in public discourse. But what is it?5 Our basic contention is that one grandstands when one makes a contribution to public moral discourse that aims to convince others that one is “morally respectable.” By this we mean that grandstanding is a use of moral talk that attempts to get others to make certain desired judgments about oneself, namely, that one is worthy of respect or admiration because one has some particular moral quality—for example, an impressive commitment to justice, a highly tuned moral sensibility, or unparalleled powers of empathy. To grandstand is to turn one's contribution to public discourse into a vanity project. In what follows, we give an account of central and distinctive features of the paradigmatic cases of grandstanding. Our view is that grandstanding, even of the moral variety, is a diverse and diffuse social phenomenon, much like, say, love, blame, forgiveness, complaint, and apology. And as is the case with these phenomena, we are skeptical that there is an illuminating and nontrivial set of necessary and sufficient conditions that capture the extension of the concept of grandstanding. Our diffuse grandstanding behaviors form a constellation, some of them closer to the center than others. The instances of grandstanding that make up the center of the constellation are the paradigmatic ones. We propose, then, to give an account of the paradigmatic cases by illuminating the features at the core of the phenomenon. Our account of grandstanding is therefore intended to capture those cases that persons familiar with the practice would most readily recognize as cases of grandstanding and would use as a frame of reference to judge whether a given phenomenon is a case of grandstanding (even if it is of a nonparadigmatic sort). We do not claim, therefore, to give a complete analysis of the concept of grandstanding, or even an exhaustive account of the phenomenon. Our account of grandstanding is limited in scope: it seeks only to illuminate the kind of grandstanding that occurs in the context of public moral discourse. We do not intend to draw a sharp distinction between public and private moral discourse, but roughly speaking, public moral discourse involves communication that is intended to bring some moral matter to public consciousness. This is in contrast to typical private moral discourse, which usually involves communication not intended to be consumed by larger segments of the moral community. We claim that the phenomenon of grandstanding is characterized by two central features. We will take them in turn. The first central feature is that the grandstander desires that others think of her as being morally respectable with regard to some matter of moral concern.6 When we say that the grandstander desires that others think of her as morally respectable, we mean that she wants others to make a positive moral assessment of her or the group with which she identifies. In some cases, a grandstander will want others to think of her simply as meeting some normative baseline whereas others fail to do so. Suppose that morality requires a certain minimum level of care about immigrants. Here, the grandstander might simply want to be seen as merely morally respectable in a world where she thinks that precious few meet even that minimum threshold. For example, a grandstander might desire that others come to believe that although virtually no one cares sufficiently about immigrants, the grandstander (or her group) does. Sometimes, however, we judge that someone does not merely meet a minimum threshold of respectability, but is highly or eminently respectable—that is, we consider some people worthy of great moral respect. So there is another sense in which a grandstander may want to be seen as respectable by meeting a loftier standard. For example, one might want others to believe that while morality requires a certain level of concern for immigrants, one's own (or one's own group's) concern for immigrants far exceeds that threshold. In these cases, one wants others to think of one as being highly or exceptionally morally respectable. Here, one wants to be seen not merely as meeting a normative baseline. Rather, one wants to be seen as a paragon of morality. The basic idea, then, is that a grandstander desires that other people recognize her as morally respectable. For ease of expression, call this desire the recognition desire.7 The content of the recognition desire may be something as general as a desire merely to be thought of as “morally respectable,” broadly construed (though perhaps not under that exact description). Here, the grandstander simply wants a general form of admiration or respect for being “on the side of the angels.” In other cases, the content of the recognition desire might be more fine-grained. Grandstanders may want to be seen as morally respectable in a number of ways. We suggest that she might want herself (or her group) to be seen as having, among other things, respectable moral beliefs (for example, about what truly counts as fairness, moral progress, or having moral integrity), moral sensibilities or emotions (for example, having a certain level of affective sensitivity to inequality), moral priorities (for example, caring about justice above all else), or practical moral judgment (for example, having an exceptional insight into what morally ought to be done). By whom does the grandstander want to be recognized as morally respectable? It depends. In some cases, the grandstander will want those in her own in-group to think of her as morally respectable. One might, for example, seek to be recognized by members of one's in-group as being on the “right side” of some issue.8 In other cases, however, the grandstander will want members of an out-group to think of her as being eminently morally respectable. One might, for example, want people with whom one disagrees to recognize one's superior moral judgment and so defer to one in moral discourse. In still other cases, one's grandstanding will be directed at a general audience, with no intention of discriminating—one simply wants one's audience to be impressed. Finally, we note that grandstanding does not require believing that one has a certain level of moral respectability. Imagine, for example, a politician who, in his speeches, feigns empathy for the plight of American factory workers because he wants voters to think that no one cares about them more than he does. Let us now turn to the second central feature of grandstanding. When people grandstand, they do so by making some kind of contribution to public moral discourse: they say or write something, for example. Call this contribution the grandstanding expression. The second central feature is this: when one grandstands, one contributes a grandstanding expression in order to satisfy the recognition desire. In other words, one's grandstanding expressions are attempts to get others to believe that one is morally respectable. Our claim here is that the recognition desire plays a motivating role in paradigmatic cases of grandstanding. Although the recognition desire may not be the only desire motivating the grandstanding expression, or even the strongest motivating desire, the recognition desire does make a significant motivating contribution. That is, the grandstander says what she does in large part because she desires that others think of her as morally respectable. However, our motives for acting are often mixed. Cases of grandstanding are no different. One might want for others to be impressed with one's unparalleled commitment to workers’ rights and also hope that, after hearing what one has to say, others will take action to support the labor movement. So how much motivational force must the recognition desire contribute for one's contribution to count as grandstanding? We think of grandstanding as a threshold notion. For a contribution to public moral discourse to count as grandstanding, the recognition desire must play a significant enough motivating role. Just how significant? We think that the desire must be strong enough that if the grandstander were to discover that no one actually came to think of her as morally respectable in the relevant way, she would be disappointed. Given that we are elucidating the central and distinctive features of the paradigmatic cases, we stress that we do not claim that all cases of grandstanding must be motivated (to some degree or another) by the recognition desire. We suspect that there may be cases of a phenomenon properly called grandstanding in which the grandstander does not possess the recognition desire at all. We are open to the possibility that grandstanding may sometimes spring from other motivational sources. For example, a person with little experience in public moral discourse might observe grandstanders in action, conclude that theirs is the ideal form of moral talk, and begin to mimic grandstanding expressions. Even though such a novice contributes in good faith, she can engage in a kind of grandstanding, though perhaps of a nonparadigmatic sort. Additionally, some behavior we might plausibly describe as grandstanding may stem from a desire to silence a rival. In such cases, one's grandstanding may be intended to undermine the credibility of others. Even in these cases, though, we suspect that the way grandstanding often (but not always) functions is to silence a rival by presenting the speaker as more morally respectable by implicit contrast. Thus, grandstanding functions as an attempt to silence or discredit other discourse participants by communicating that their opinions are not worth considering or engaging because they are held by someone who is not morally respectable, or much less so. At any rate, we will focus on what we take to be the clearest cases of grandstanding—cases in which the grandstander does possess the recognition desire, and this desire plays a significant role in motivating her contribution to public moral discourse. In this section, we explore the characteristic ways that grandstanding is manifested in public moral discourse. As we will explain, grandstanding characteristically manifests itself in several phenomena: (1) piling on; (2) ramping up; (3) trumping up; (4) excessive emotional displays or reports; and (5) claims of self-evidence. A good, general account of the central features of grandstanding should have the resources to explain why it has these characteristic manifestations. We will show that the account we provided in Section 1, when conjoined with some standard theses in social psychology, does so.9 I want to echo what others have said. This petition is vital to the cause of justice and I happily and wholeheartedly support it. We need to show that we are on the right side of history. Our account explains why grandstanding would be manifested in this way: if one desires that others think of one as, say, being a member of a morally respectable group, an obvious strategy for satisfying this desire is to register one's view in the public square, even if doing so does not substantively advance discussion. One way to understand piling on is as an expression of a widely studied phenomenon in social psychology—that of social comparison: people generally want to perceive themselves favorably and be perceived favorably by others.10 Writing about the phenomenon of social comparison as manifested in the context of group deliberation, Cass Sunstein tells us that once discussants “hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position.”11 Members of the group, not wanting to be seen as cowardly or cautious in relation to other members of the group, will then register their agreement so as not to be perceived by others less favorably than those who have already spoken up. Piling on therefore offers a way of being perceived favorably by others. So grandstanders can pile on as a way of getting others to see them as members of a morally respectable group. Ann: We can all agree that the senator's behavior was wrong and that she should be publicly censured. Biff: Oh please—if we really cared about justice we should seek her removal from office. We simply cannot tolerate that sort of behavior and I will not stand for it. Cal: As someone who has long fought for social justice, I'm sympathetic to these suggestions, but does anyone know the criminal law on this issue? I want to suggest that we should pursue criminal charges. We would all do well to remember that the world is watching. Our general account also explains why grandstanding would often manifest itself in ramping up: if one of the possible motivations for grandstanding is to show that one is more morally respectable than others, then we can often expect a sort of moral arms race. Increasingly strong claims can be used to signal that one is more attuned to matters of justice and that others simply do not understand or appreciate the nuance or gravity of the situation.12 As with cases of piling on, psychological research on social comparison offers an explanation for why ramping up occurs. We can think of it this way. People often imagine themselves as occupying a certain position in comparison to others. For example, one might think that one is more morally respectable than most. Such a general judgment is often made before hearing what others say about their own views, however. Once we do hear what others’ views are, we might need to shift our own views (or at least our presentation of them) in order to be perceived (both by ourselves and by others) as retaining the position we previously took ourselves to hold. To see this, recall the above conversation. Biff and Cal might have considered themselves to be morally respectable in some way about the matter under discussion. But this was before Ann made her own moral recommendation public. Once Ann offers her moral diagnosis, Biff and Cal now must make a move in order to retain their perceived position within the group. And so, as Sunstein tells us, while the dynamic behind social comparison “is that most people want to take a position of a socially preferred sort ... no one can know what such a position would be until the positions of others are revealed. Thus individuals move their judgments in order to preserve their image to others and their image to themselves.”13 In other words, not only will Biff's and Cal's grandstanding tend to push the group's views toward one extreme, Ann herself may end up shifting her own view in order to maintain the image she wishes to project to the rest of the group. Relatedly, grandstanding may take the form of what we can call trumping up: the insistence on the existence of a moral problem where there is none. If grandstanders are eager to show that they are morally respectable, they may be too eager to identify as moral problems things that others have (correctly) taken to be morally unproblematic. Trumping up functions to show that one is morally respectable insofar as one has, for example, a keener moral sense than others. Whereas some alleged injustices fall below the moral radar of many, they are not missed by the vigilant eye of the morally respectable. Our account explains this manifestation of grandstanding: one may try to show that one is morally respectable by trying to draw attention to features of the world that (rightly) seem morally unproblematic to others. Fourth, grandstanding is often characterized by displays or reports of excessive outrage or other strong emotions. Where moral outrage gains purchase, the implicit assumption is that the most outraged person has the greatest moral insight or perhaps the strongest moral conviction about the issue under discussion. Empirical work on moral conviction reveals that emotional displays are often good indicators of how someone a moral For example, consider work in social on “moral strong and that something is right or moral or are a of moral judgments by (1) they are taken to be universal say, (2) they are thought to identify and obvious of the and (3) they are of strong emotional that say, or one's in right or particular note here is that are strong between having moral about and having strong emotional to these that emotional to or for example, and the with moral conviction about those or and that this is so even when for such as It then that something a or of one's outrage about a moral issue can be a signal of the of one's moral conviction about it. If so, such emotional displays be used to to others one's own moral to other group Grandstanders may then this assumption and so outrage to signal that they are more by moral in the or more with of Such displays of outrage may others to regard one as more morally or and this is why our account explains why grandstanding so often involves excessive to be seen as more morally or is one way of being seen as morally respectable. Finally, the account of grandstanding we have makes sense of the that grandstanders often claim that their views are cannot see that this is how we should then I to engage any of can be used to signal that one's moral sensibilities are more tuned than those of others, and that one is morally respectable. is not obvious to others is obvious to the any of moral or expression of or is often by the grandstander as a in sensitivity to moral or commitment to morality We suspect that most people would agree that grandstanding is We think that it is also morally In our the of moral grandstanding is and, in one should not grandstand. We will some reasons for this view but we should make a few we will not that grandstanding should be We are open to the possibility that there are in which an of grandstanding no features even if an does have the of not grandstanding will be even we will not claim that people who grandstand are bad people in of engaging in grandstanding. We all have that are on in the public in grandstanding is not than many other and a to grandstand is not that someone good although we do believe that grandstanding is typically bad and should not be we are not any particular social to deal with it. our are the nature of grandstanding and its moral It does not follow, at least in any way, that people should in public moral discourse to others from grandstanding, or to them for grandstanding. Fourth, we between an to the morality of an of grandstanding and an to the morality of the more general social practice of grandstanding. For example, a of grandstanding may a certain feature even though that may play an important role in the promotion of a practice of grandstanding that does have feature The may also of grandstanding may be bad in ways that do not to the more general practice. of our will grandstanding at both of these will be at only one or the other of these we will note the of Finally, we note that one's considered views about the morality of grandstanding will in no part on one's views about normative more We try to remain among moral and intend only to a number of moral problems with grandstanding. The we however, are is, as it something here for about the that instances of it and its general has on public moral discourse. To bring these into it is to grandstanding to a that one of the features of is that it has little to do with the justifying or of the more general practice with which it is with the efficacy of making that discussants believe to be As more people begin the of discourse less and so Although grandstanding need not be a form of it can with the efficacy of public discourse. To see consider that public moral discourse may do a number of things, but the that the practice is to identify publicly certain moral features of a of and sometimes to explain the of that or some In short, the of public moral discourse is to moral or to moral in the To be to public moral discourse sometimes to at some other in to beliefs and is not a bad But doing so be if it would undermine our ability to the aims of public moral discourse. We think that grandstanding does with the of public moral discourse, and that this is one to think that morally Here, we discuss bad of grandstanding that, in our with the of discourse: outrage and group We will take them in turn. an about moral discourse. as we use the is a form of and about the of to moral that many instances of grandstanding because grandstanders want to be as being on the side of the However, once come to see this as a common for moral they may begin to think that moral discourse is really all about that is in the right therefore may play a significant role in about moral discourse. moral discourse may under the of many are in intended to get others to believe that one is morally respectable. Thus, as grandstanding more it to a of the social of moral And even if instances of grandstanding only a little of they may end up a more to what and call a that us to expect that others are more than is actually the In other words, even if instances themselves only a little of this may us to be more about public moral discourse in even when no one is grandstanding. The of the general practice of grandstanding therefore a of even more some might us as of being about public discourse. this is we are But we suspect that this is in part to the existence of a general practice of grandstanding. we know many people engage in it, this makes it to be about moral discourse in But this, of is our way that grandstanding may public moral discourse is what we call outrage grandstanding so often involves excessive outrage or other emotional we that participants in public moral discourse will often have a more when outrage is a signal of and will also find it to outrage when it actually is Our therefore, is not about moral outrage as think that there are of injustices for which moral outrage is is our concern that people may about when certain of outrage are Rather, the is that because grandstanding can emotional displays that are to their and because grandstanding often the form of ramping a public discourse by grandstanding will be to this This can at the level of cases of grandstanding, but it is to discourse when grandstanding is widely Relatedly, because grandstanding often in what we have called ramping up and trumping it contributes to group the phenomenon by which members of a group tend to move toward more for example, imagine that after a highly a group of people in the to consider new Suppose that most of the group new at the deliberation, however, the

Blame · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Indignation · Moral agency · Moral authority · Moral development · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Morality · Political science · Politics · Social cognitive theory of morality · Sociology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology

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