Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6325683 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Otsuka (0000-0002-5639-1712, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 109-135 |
| Publication date | 2006-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00058.x |
| OpenAlex | W2121193047 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 31 |
| References cited | 6 |
Have you a duty to save the greater rather than the lesser number from death when you cannot save all? Most moral philosophers would reply that you do, at least when so doing is of little cost to you and “all other things are equal,” which is to say that death is equally bad for each, and none of the imperiled is family or friend as opposed to a stranger, and so forth. It is, however, surprisingly difficult to provide sound theoretical support for such a seemingly uncontroversial duty. These difficulties highlight some contrasting problems for competing contractualist and consequentialist accounts of morality.
Citation · Library science · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
The Morality of Defensive Force
Justice In-Between
How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?
On the Possibility of Nonaggregative Priority for the Worst Off
A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases
The Exclusionary Power of Political Directives
A Personalist Approach to the Just Allocation of Resources in the Midst of a Pandemic
Should rare diseases get special treatment
Counting People and Making People Count
Would a Viable Consent App Create Headaches for Consequentialists
Each counts for one
Weighing Up Weighted Lotteries
Individualist Theories and Interpersonal Aggregation
On Ex Ante Contractualism
Contractualism, Reciprocity, and Compensation
What Is Wrong with Kamm's and Scanlon's Arguments Against Taurek
Against Hirose's Argument for Saving the Greater Number
Who prefers the ‘cost‐effectiveness ratio’ prioritization approach in health‐care decisions? Results of an empirical analysis
The Rules of Rescue
Don’t Count on Taurek
Against Anonymous Pareto
Spinning the Wheel or Tossing a Coin
Aggregation with Constraints
Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons
Aggregate Relevant Claims in Rescue Cases
Limits to Aggregation and Uncertain Rescues
Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals
Love and the Value of a Life
Allocative Fairness
The Numbers Problem
Partial aggregation in ethics
| Unique citing works | 31 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,55 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |