An Institutional Conception of Authority
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6325913 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrei Marmor (0000-0002-0956-3243, University of Southern California, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 238-261 |
| Publication date | 2011-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01208.x |
| OpenAlex | W1853715660 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
The essay develops a conception of practical authorities that ties their legitimacy to the particular nature of the social practice or institution in which practical authorities invariably operate, and the terms of the subjects’ participation in that practice. The main argument of the paper draws on the distinction between what it takes to have practical authority and what would make it legitimate. The general idea is that what it takes to have practical authority is always determined by a social or institutional practice, and thus the legitimacy of any given authority crucially depends on the nature of the practice and the terms of participation in it. One result of this argument is that there is no single general principle that determines the conditions of the legitimacy of authorities. In some cases, legitimacy depends on consent, in other cases, it does not; either way, it is the nature of the practice or institution in which a practical authority operates that crucially determines the authority’s legitimacy.\nThe main argument of this essay is preceded by a clarification of the nature of authoritative directives and the obligatory nature of the reasons to comply with a legitimate directive. I argue that the obligation to comply is not directional (viz., owed to the authority), and that it does not involve the kind of moral accountability that we normally associate with directional obligations
Accountability · Argument (complex analysis · Directive · Institution · Law and economics · Legal research · Legitimacy · Obligation · Political science · Politics · Primary authority · Sociology · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification
Reasons First
The Grounds of Political Legitimacy
Coordination Cannot Establish Political Authority
Liquid authority in global governance
Standards as Authority
The Service Conception, Specification Problem and Its Moral Foundations
The Problem of Pluralist Authority
Authority and Reason‐Giving 1
The artificial morality of private law
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,64 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |