The Organization of Public Interest Groups

Bibliographic Data

ID6328368
AuthorsPeter W Colby (Binghamton University, corresponding author)
Year1983
Volume11
Issue4
Pages699-708
Publication date1983-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolicy Studies Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1541-0072.1983.tb00572.x
OpenAlexW2004063030
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited10

The topic here is whether broad public interests in consumer rights, a clean environment, and political reform have the organizational strength to be represented effectively when policy‐making is the responsibility of bureaus and administrative agencies. The most persuasive explanation of why such interests could not be effective on a sustained basis is the collective action theory of Mancur Olson. The paper supports research arguing for modifications of Olson's theory by showing how public interests have been at least partially successful in maintaining effectiveness over time based on four concepts: the similarity of public interest groups to social movements, the use of purposive and solidary incentives, the use of material incentives to support lobbying as a by‐product of other activities, and the role of organizational entrepreneurs supported by new technology, notably the computerized mailing list

Action (physics · Business · Collective action · Economics · Incentive · Interest group · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Product (mathematics · Public economics · Public good · Public interest · Public relations · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research

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