Between Autonomy and Capture
Embedding Government Agencies in Their Societal Environment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6329829 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Echeverri‐gent (0000-0002-9018-0986, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 342-364 |
| Publication date | 1992-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Policy Studies Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1992.tb00163.x |
| OpenAlex | W2154922473 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 58 |
This article uses organization theory and political economy to develop a conceptual framework, for analyzing factors that shape relations between government agencies and their social environment. The framework conceptualizes these relations as social networks composed of actors engaged in the exchange of resources. Then, it develops an understanding of how cultural norms shape these exchanges. The article concludes by examining the framework's normative implications. In particular, it explores when agency autonomy promotes effective policy implementation and when it results in unaccountability. It also demonstrates that, in many cases, an agency's dependence on actors in its environment may enhance the effectiveness of policy implementation
Agency (philosophy · Autonomy · Business · Conceptual framework · Economic system · Economics · Government (linguistics · Normative · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Social exchange theory · Social science · Sociology · Management and Organizational Studies · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Organizational Learning
Structure and change in economic history
Political Language
Institutional structure
The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington— More Groups, Less Clout
The Cybernetic Theory of Decision
Regulating Business by Independent Commission
The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis
Monetary Politics
Politics against Markets
State Structures and the Possibilities for “Keynesian” Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States
Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice
The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Organizational environments
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
Defending the National Interest
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
The New American Political System
The State and Poverty in India
The Limits of Rationality
Participation in development
Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy
An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein
Technology and the human prospect
"The Market for "Lemons
The three worlds of welfare capitalism
Meaning and Moral Order
Sovereignty
The New Economics of Organization
Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process
Predatory, developmental, and other apparatuses
Organizational Legitimacy
The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence
Culture in Action
The Iron Cage Revisited
Why are Congressional Committees Powerful
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
Stacking the Deck
Cultures in Conflict. The Four Faces of Indian Bureaucracy
On Creating Efficient Industrial Administrations
Information Control as a Power Resource
Corporate Economic Power and the State
Autonomy in a Social Topology
Institutionalized Organizations
| Citations per year | 0.1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 2020 (25) |
| Highly cited | No |