When Businesses Collide
Producer Interest Groups and the Politics of Regulation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6330353 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Heather E Campbell (0000-0002-5233-7057, Arizona State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 310-328 |
| Publication date | 1998-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Policy Studies Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1998.tb01901.x |
| OpenAlex | W2053638731 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 19 |
Much interest‐group analysis assumes that producer‐group pressures are especially influential. Sometimes business interests conflict; in that case, which producer groups will be most influential? Using data from 54 state telephone rate cases, this paper explores the relative influence of several different intervener types. Estimates indicate that influencing outcomes depends on credible information rather than other resources, and also that business interest groups cannot all be considered homogenous. Some implications for the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are drawn
Business · Economics · Group (periodic table · Industrial organization · Interest group · Interest rate · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Special Interest Group · State (computer science · Computer Science · ICT Impact and Policies · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Finance
Regulation
Elements of Econometrics
Politics in the American States
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
The Logic of Collective Action
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups
Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System
Bureaucratic Responsiveness
An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation
| Citations per year | 0.12 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2000 - 2004 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |