Parties in Elections, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6332006 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keith Krehbiel (Stanford University), Adam Meirowitz (0000-0003-4671-8889, Princeton University), Thomas Romer (Princeton University) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 113-138 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Analysis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1047-1987 • E-ISSN: 1476-4989 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pan/mpi007 |
| OpenAlex | W2570392609 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 31 |
Political parties are active when citizens choose among candidates inelectionsand when winning candidates choose among policy alternatives ingovernment. But the inextricably linked institutions, incentives, and behavior that determine these multistage choices are substantively complex and analytically unwieldy, particularly if modeled explicitly and considered in total, from citizen preferences through government outcomes. To strike a balance between complexity and tractability, we modify standard spatial models of electoral competition and governmental policy-making to study how components of partisanship—such as candidate platform separation in elections, party ID-based voting, national partisan tides, and party-disciplined behavior in the legislature—are related to policy outcomes. We definepartisan biasas the distance between the following two points in a conventional choice space: the ideal point of the median voter in the median legislative district and the policy outcome selected by the elected legislature. The study reveals that none of the party-in-electorate conditions is capable of producing partisan bias independently. Specified combinations of conditions, however, can significantly increase the bias and/or the variance of policy outcomes, sometimes in subtle ways
Benchmark (surveying · Competition (biology · Divided government · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Variance (accounting · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Accounting · Law · Public Administration
Setting the Agenda
Candidates with policy preferences
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate
Pivotal Politics
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics
National Party Decision Making, Strategies, and Resource Distribution in Congressional Elections
Stability in Competition
Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections
Party Government and the Saliency of Congress
The Allocation of Party Controlled Campaign Resources in the House of Representatives, 1989-1996
Dancing with the One Who Brought You
Minority Rights and Majority Power
A Theory of Partisan Support and Entry Deterrence in Electoral Competition
Controlling the Floor
Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Where's the Party
Party Organization and Distribution of Campaign Resources
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Where's the Party? Congressional Candidate Recruitment and American Party Organizations
Candidate Motivation
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2020 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |