Studying Dynamics in Legislator Ideal Points
Scale Matters
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6332188 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael C Herron (0000-0002-2021-2495, Dartmouth College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 182-190 |
| Publication date | 2004-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Analysis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1047-1987 • E-ISSN: 1476-4989 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pan/mph013 |
| OpenAlex | W2095877250 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 10 |
Research designs that call for the estimation of time trends in legislator ideal points must allow for changes in underlying policy spaces. Simply put, a set of legislator ideal points from one such space cannot necessarily be compared with a set of ideal points from another. Rothenberg and Sanders's (2000, American Journal of Political Science 44:316–325) analysis of shirking in Congress does not internalize this point insofar as it assumes that legislator ideal points from adjoining congressional sessions lie in a common space. While it may be the case that members of Congress shirk ideologically when approaching retirement, the regression estimates at the heart of Rothenberg and Sanders neither support this possibility nor constitute evidence against it
Economics · Ideal (ethics · Ideology · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislator · Point (geometry · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Mathematics · Policy Transfer and Learning · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Law
Legislative Responsiveness to Gerrymandering
Dynamic estimation of ideal points for the US Congress
Taking the Measure of Congress
Much Ado About Very Little
Do Term Limits Affect Legislative Roll Call Voting? Representation, Polarization, and Participation
The Effects of Measurement and Methods Decisions on Committee Preference Outlier Results
Polarization and Ideology
Comparing Legislators and Legislatures
Measurement Uncertainty in Spatial Models
Measuring the Ideologies of U. S. Senators
Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives
Political shirking and the last term problem
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999
Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court
Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers
Severing the Electoral Connection
| Citations per year | 0.41 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2004 - 2019 (16) |
| Highly cited | No |