External Territorial Threats and Military Regimes

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6338799
AutoresNam Kyu Kim (0000-0003-0621-4192, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen72
Número4
Páginas863-877
Fecha de publicación2019-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912918812743
OpenAlexW2903546668
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12
Referencias citadas50

This study argues that sustained threats to homeland territory create an environment conducive to the presence of military regimes. Territorial threats lead to increased levels of militarization and make the military internally unified and cohesive. These developments enhance the military’s capacity for intervening in politics where a strong and autonomous military serves as an institutionalized veto player. Accordingly, collegial military regimes, characterized by a group of high-ranking officers and distinct from military strongman rule in which power is concentrated in the hands of a single military leader, are likely to exist in environments rife with territorial threats. Supporting my argument, I find that a country is more likely to experience collegial military rule when it engages in rivalries or claims over territorial issues

Argument (complex analysis · Democracy · Homeland · Militarization · Military rule · Military theory · Military threat · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Veto · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance