Resources, Rent Diversification, and the Collapse of Autocratic Regimes

Bibliographic Data

ID6340609
AuthorsMatthew Fails (0000-0003-3371-3026, Oakland University, Rochester, MI, USA), Matthew D Fails, Marc C Dubuis (Oakland University, Rochester, MI, USA)
Year2015
Volume68
Issue4
Pages703-715
Publication date2015-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912915601895
OpenAlexW1892941857
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited39

A growing literature demonstrates that “unearned income”—such as that which stems from natural resources—stabilizes authoritarian regimes. In this paper, we refine this argument to emphasize not just the volume of these rents but also their diversity and the extent to which they can act as substitutes for one another. Specifically, a greater number of distinct sources of rents, and a more equitable distribution among them, provide an important hedge against any sudden change in the ability of autocracies to capture these rents and should lead to more stable regimes. We use a procedure from the literature on market concentration to develop a single measure, termed rent diversification, which captures these characteristics. We then use this new measure in a quantitative analysis examining the likelihood of regime failure. Our findings provide strong evidence that autocracies with more diversified rent portfolios are much less likely to collapse

Autocracy · Business · Diversification (marketing strategy · Economic rent · Economics · Market economy · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Development and Aid · Natural Resources and Economic Development

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