Allocating Lobbying Resources between Collective and Private Rents
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6340832 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R Kenneth Godwin (University of North Carolina at Charlotte), Edward J Lopez (San Jose State University, California), Barry J Seldon (The University of Texas at Dallas) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 345-359 |
| Publication date | 2008-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Research Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912907307290 |
| OpenAlex | W1982921336 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 31 |
How do firms allocate their lobbying resources among their political goals? The authors approach this question using a game-theoretic model that integrates three concepts from the lobbying literature: the distinction between private and collective rents, the competition for a rent, and the impacts of political institutions. The model indicates how competition and political institutions affect lobbying expenditures and expected net returns for private and collective lobbying. The outcomes predicted differ with those of past formal models and produce the counterintuitive expectation that competition typically reduces expenditures. The authors test the model's predictions by examining the lobbying decisions of sixty-two firms
Collective action · Competition (biology · Counterintuitive · Economic rent · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Private information retrieval · Public economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Assessing business advantage in Washington lobbying
The determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU
Politically Connected Firms
Who will deregulate the deregulators
Business as a Collaborative Partner
Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits
The balancing act of establishing a policy agenda
Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence
Autonomy or Privilege? Lobbying Intensity of Local Business Associations in China
Spaces of lobbying
Political organizations
Basic Interests
Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
Interest groups
Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
Social choice and welfare
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
Efficient Rent-Seeking
The Logic of Collective Action
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting
One Billion Dollars of Influence
The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions
A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests
Neopluralism
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox
Buying Time
Legislators and Interest Groups
The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,63 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2025 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |