The Political Economy of Simultaneous Transitions
An Empirical Test of Two Models
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6341256 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Branislav L Slantchev (0000-0003-3404-5242, University of California San Diego, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 279-294 |
| Publication date | 2005-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Research Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591290505800208 |
| OpenAlex | W2061791286 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 29 |
Traditional political economy emphasizes the difficulty of conducting simultaneous transitions toward market economy and democratic government. There are two major theories that seek to explain why some reform programs are never fully implemented or are reversed shortly after their inception. The J-Curve model (JCM) (Przeworski 1993) implicates the short-term losers from reform as the major opposition, and the Partial Reform Equilibrium model (PREM) (Hellman 1998) implicates the winners. I subject the models to empirical analysis with data from 25 post-communist countries and find that the data do not support the contention of the JCM. High unemployment rates do not threaten the survival of reform programs, and government instability does not necessarily translate into bad economic policies. These results suggest that the common concern that socially costly economic reforms endanger the consolidation of democratic norms may be misplaced
Consolidation (business · Democracy · Economic reform · Economic system · Economics · Empirical research · Government (linguistics · Macroeconomics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Unemployment · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Russia and Soviet political economy
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The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform
The dynamics of within-regime stability
The personal vote and economic reform
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Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies
Lending Credibility
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The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions
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The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-communist World
Understanding the political implications of financial internationalization in emerging market countries
Rules Rather than Discretion
Recent Developments in Macroeconomics
Winners Take All
Public Support for Economic Reforms in Poland
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations
Decision Making in Political Systems
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Societies in TransitionOld Societies and New States. Clifford Geertz
Echoes from the Past
| Citations per year | 0.39 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2020 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |