Backscratching in banks

Political Cycles in Bank Manager Appointments

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6342010
AutoresJonas Markgraf (0000-0002-1142-3880, University of Oxford, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume10
Fascículo3
Páginas667-674
Data de publicação2022-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2020.52
OpenAlexW3115108180
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas22

Close ties between politicians and businesses affect firms’ performance and political outcomes, and while direct political control over firms has been curtailed by tightened regulation, political connections remain ubiquitous in many countries. Yet, it is unclear through which channels these linkages are maintained in strictly regulated environments. I speculate that one such channel of political control over firms is politicians’ ability to influence corporate appointment decisions. To test the claim, I employ survival models that analyze chairpersons’ turnovers in 90 Spanish savings banks between 1985 and 2010 and find strong evidence for electoral appointment cycles: bank chairpersons are more likely to lose office shortly after regional elections and when new governments enter office

Affect (linguistics · Business · Control (management · Economics · Management · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Test (biology · Corporate Finance and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies