(When) are lobbying expenditures a good proxy for lobbying activity

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6342135
AutoresSebastian Thieme (0000-0002-8153-9379, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Páginas1-8
Data de publicação2024-10-11
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2024.59
OpenAlexW4403473662
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas26

Lobbying expenditures are widely used as a proxy variable for measuring lobbying activity. However, the validity of this approach has rarely been examined and existing justifications do not account for heterogeneity in expenditure formats across types of lobbyists. I address the question using unique lobbying disclosure data from Wisconsin, where lobbying organizations report both expenditures on lobbying-related activities and lobbyists’ hours worked. Strong overall correlations between changes in expenditures and hours worked within organization–lobbyist dyads indicate that lobbying expenditures can serve as a reasonable proxy. However, caution is warranted due to substantial heterogeneity, with contract lobbyist relationships exhibiting weaker correlations than in-house relationships. I conclude by providing suggestions to improve empirical analyses that rely on lobbying expenditures

Economics · Proxy (statistics · Public economics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies