How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6342156
AutoresArnold Bennett Hall (0000-0001-7185-2196, Harvard University Press), Andrew B Hall, Jane Mcintosh Snyder (0000-0002-1386-2844, Harvard University Press), James M Snyder
Año2015
Volumen3
Número3
Páginas493-514
Fecha de publicación2015-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2014.43
OpenAlexW1993794196
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas28
Referencias citadas32

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats

Demographic economics · Econometrics · Economics · Legislature · Political science · Regression discontinuity design · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Mathematics