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Political Parties, Political Integrity and Public Policy

A ‘Transactions Costs' Approach

Bibliographic Data

ID6344110
AuthorsPhilip Jones (0000-0003-2860-1660, University of Bath), Jonell Hudson (0000-0002-8290-2942, University of Bath), John Hudson (0000-0001-7323-384X, University of Bath)
Year2001
Volume49
Issue1
Pages70-88
Publication date2001-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9248.00303
OpenAlexW2043658607
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited27

Increasing concern about political ‘sleaze’ prompted the establishment, in 1995, of the Standing Committee of Standards in Public Life and the announcement, in 1999, of proposals to reform political party finance in the UK. A ‘public choice’ analysis predicts ‘opportunism’ by representatives at the expense of ‘rationally ignorant’ voters. It commends constitutional constraints to restrict the range of policy options open to representatives. By contrast, a ‘transactions costs' approach suggests that electoral competition can offer protection when voters rely on ‘party signal’ as a low cost information source. If voters reduce transactions costs by relying on party signal, politicians have an incentive to maintain party reputation. Representatives are more willing than might otherwise be anticipated to accept the need for regulation if this serves to protect reputation

Business · Campaign finance · Competition (biology · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Opportunism · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Reputation · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

  • The Economics of Political Integrity

    Open Access•Philip Jones, Jonell Hudson et al.•Political Studies•2002

  • Why transaction costs are so relevant in political governance? a new institutional survey

    Open Access•Gonzalo Caballero, DAVID SOTO-OÑATE•Brazilian Journal of Political…•2016

  • The Economics of Political Integrity

    Open Access•Jonathan Hopkins, Jonathan Hopkin•Political Studies•2002

  • All for One and One for All

    Open Access•Philip Jones•Political Studies•2004

  • Public choice in political markets

    Open Access•Philip Jones, Philip J Jones•European Journal of Political…•2003

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    Roger Jowell•British Social Attitudes•1994

  • Democracy and Decision

    Open Access•Geoffrey Brennan, Loren Lomasky•Democracy and Decision•1993

  • The British General Election of 1992

    Open Access•David Butler, Dennis Kavanagh•British General Election Of 1992•1992

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    Anthony Downs•An economic theory of democracy•1985

  • Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties

    Moisei Ostrogorski•Democracy and the Organization of…•2018

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  • Towards a positive theory of political rhetoric

    Open Access•Michael L Davis, Michael Ferrantino et al.•Public Choice•1996

  • Preferences, loyalty and party choice

    Open Access•Jonell Hudson, John Hudson•Public Choice•1995

  • The role of political parties

    Open Access•Philip Jones, Jonell Hudson et al.•Public Choice•1998

  • Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House

    Steven D Levitt•Journal of Political Economy•1994

  • The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets

    Barry R Weingast, William Marshall et al.•Journal of Political Economy•1988

  • Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results

    Donald Wittman•Journal of Political Economy•1989

  • Constitutions and Commitment

    Open Access•Douglass C North, Barry R Weingast•The Journal of Economic History•1989

  • A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic Virtues

    Open Access•Bruno S Frey•The Economic Journal•1997

  • The Nature of the Firm

    Ronald H Coase•Economica•1937

  • Towards an Understanding of Turnout at British General Elections

    Ron Johnston, R J Johnston et al.•Parliamentary Affairs•1997

  • Donations to Political Parties

    John Fisher•Parliamentary Affairs•1997

  • Rational Choice and Turnout

    John H Aldrich•American Journal of Political…•1993

  • The Quality of Political Leadership

    Open Access•Philip Jones, Jonell Hudson et al.•British Journal of Political…•1996

Unique citing works5
Citations per year0,21
Citation span2002 - 2016 (15)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 5

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