What Does the Discursive Paradox Really Mean for Democracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6344124 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Valeria Ottonelli (0000-0001-6754-5986, University of Genova, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 666-687 |
| Publication date | 2010-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00821.x |
| OpenAlex | W1849355654 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 48 |
Pettit's claim that the discovery of the so-called ‘discursive paradox’ bears important implications for the normative theory of deliberative democracy has been challenged on the ground that there are substantial structural differences between the fora of democratic deliberation and the judicial context in which the paradox first emerged. In this article I defend Pettit's claim against these objections, but I also reject the implications Pettit draws from his discussion of the paradox. Specifically, I argue against one of the key assumptions on which Pettit's discussion rests: that in order to function properly as a guarantee against tyranny deliberation requires consistency. The upshot of the discussion is that the discursive paradox is, indeed, relevant for the theory of deliberative democracy. However, contrary to what Pettit's argument suggests, the discursive paradox is not relevant because it reveals a conflict between deliberation and democracy. Rather, it is relevant because it reveals a conflict between deliberative democracy and the requirement of collective consistency
Argument (complex analysis · Consistency (knowledge bases · Context (archaeology · Deliberation · Deliberative democracy · Democracy · Economics · Epistemology · Function (biology · Law and economics · Normative · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law in Society and Culture · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Why Deliberative Democracy?
Unpacking the Court
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
Aggregating Sets of Judgments
Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy
Foundations of social choice theory
Joining the Dots
An Epistemic Conception of Democracy
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma
Democracy Defended
Slinging Arrows at Democracy
Agreement without Theory
Designing Democracy
Depoliticizing Democracy
Incompletely Theorized Agreements
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Deliberative Democracy and Beyond
On the Many as One
Ranking judgments in Arrow’s setting
Aggregating Sets of Judgments
On the role of language in social choice theory
Rational Aggregation
Aggregate rationality in adjudication and legislation
The Possibility of Rational Outcomes from Democratic Discourse and Procedures
Aggregation and Deliberation
On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation
Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice
The Many as One
Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy
Between Facts and Norms
| Citations per year | 0.19 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Highly cited | No |