Voting, Rationality and Reputation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6344149 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Vittorio Bufacchi (0000-0001-7236-117X, University College Cork, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 714-729 |
| Publication date | 2001-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00338 |
| OpenAlex | W2056965699 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 19 |
Why do people vote? This paper presents a solution to the voting paradox in rational choice theory, based on the interaction between two concepts: externalities (James Coleman) and reputation (Einar Overbye). Elaborating on the idea that voting is an investment in one's reputation, I will argue that there are two concepts of reputation: reputation-of-power and reputation-of-trust. The solution to the voting paradox can be found in the reputation-game between social actors holding these two different forms of reputation. During an electoral campaign, powerful opinion leaders can employ their reputation-of-power (power to impose sanctions) in order to get mere voters to vote in a certain way. The aim of the powerful opinion leaders is not to influence the outcome of the election but simply to acquire or maintain their reputation, while mere voters have an interest to vote as told in order to appear trustworthy (reputation-of-trust) to powerful opinion leaders. The act of voting is an unintended consequence of this power game
Economics · Law and economics · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public relations · Rationality · Reputation · Voting · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Finance · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Watchful eyes
When are politicians incentivized to vote? Evidence from individual-level panel data (2015–2023)
Rational’ Theories of Voter Turnout
Polls and Elections
Social identity and voting behavior
Something about young people or something about elections? Electoral participation of young people in Europe
Late Anti-Communism as a Shortcut
I've Got My Eyes on You
Affect, Social Pressure and Prosocial Motivation
David and Goliath in the poll booth
Participatory processes and their outcomes
Game Theory and Economic Modelling
Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation
An economic theory of democracy
Rational Choice and Political Power
Perspectives on Public Choice
When is it rational to vote?
The Nature of Rationality
Making a case for the rational, self‐regarding, ‘ethical’ voter… and solving the ‘Paradox of not voting’ in the process
Italy—Republic Without Government
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society
The tanner lectures on human values, VIII
Rational Choice and Community Power Structures
Rational Turnout
The Importance of Being Asked
Inscrutable Markets
A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action
Foundations of Social Theory
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,55 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |