Oakeshott and the Impossibility of Philosophical Politics

Bibliographic Data

ID6344429
AuthorsDale Hall (University College, Swansea), T Modood (0000-0001-8712-5508, Queen's University Belfast)
Year1982
Volume30
Issue2
Pages157-176
Publication date1982-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.1982.tb00529.x
OpenAlexW2065696460
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited1

Oakeshott offers a radical version of the thesis that philosophy cannot evaluate or recommend political ideas. We criticize each stage of his argument that practical life excludes philosophy's desire for ultimate truth and demands a distinctive form of reasoning. Believing that practice is not susceptible to philosophical guidance because it is composed of actions, subject to change and necessarily inconsistent and uncritical of assumptions, he exaggerates its contrast with theory. Moreover, he wrongly supposes that philosophy has no practical aspect, arguing that while all practical thought must be in terms of certain concepts, philosophy transcends those which it analyses. We contend that the distinctiveness of philosophy and practice does not imply they are separate; rather philosophy is a necessary part of any reasoned evaluation of political concepts

Analytic philosophy · Argument (complex analysis · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Impossibility · Metaphilosophy · Optimal distinctiveness theory · Philosophical methodology · Philosophical theory · Philosophy of sport · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Subject (documents · Computer Science · Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy, History, and Historiography · Psychology · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Social Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub