Bureaucratic Power and Public Policies
A Test of the Rational Staff Maximization Hypothesis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6344891 |
|---|---|
| Authors | George A Boyne (Polytechnic of Wales, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 79-104 |
| Publication date | 1987-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1987.tb00189.x |
| OpenAlex | W2007893912 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 23 |
This paper tests the staff maximization hypothesis that bureaucratic power is positively related to labour inputs to the production of public sector goods and services. The context of the test is the staffing policies of three groups of British local authorities in three time periods. The relationship between bureaucratic power and changes in authorities' staff is estimated while controlling for the influence of local party politics, central grants and conditions in the environment of the local political system. The results of the statistical analysis refute the staff maximization hypothesis
Bureaucracy · Context (archaeology · Economics · Management · Maximization · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Production (economics · Public economics · Public good · Staffing · Test (biology · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics
Assessing rational-choice models of budgeting--from budget-maximising to bureaushaping
Bureaucratic Power and Public Policies
Median voters, political systems and public policies
Politics, Unemployment and Local Economic Policies
Self‐interest in public administration
The Determinants of Variations in Local Service Contracting
When Politics Matters
Time, Parties and Budgetary Change
Bureaucrats and Politicians
Bureaucracy, Monopoly, and Competition
Theory, Methodology and Results in Political Science – The Case of Output Studies
Toward a general theory of managerial discretion
Budget-maximizing governmental agencies
Socio‐economic Conditions, Central Policies and Local Authority Staffing Levels
Rational Politicians and Rational Bureaucrats in Washington and Whitehall
The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau
Bureaucracy and state intervention
Fishing Expedition Probability
Bureaucratic Politics and Power
Output Disaggregation and the Quest for the Impact of Local Politics
Urban Road Provision in England and Wales 1962-68
Municipal Expenditures in Norway
Borough Politics” and “County Government” Administrative Styles in the Old Structure
Changes in labour power on district and county councils
Bureaucrats and Budgeting Benefits
The Cumulation Problem in Political Science an Essay on Research Strategies
Formal Models in Political Science
The New Economics of Organization
Housing Administrators and Empire Building
Party and Policy in West German Cities
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
| Citations per year | 0.23 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1987 - 2015 (29) |
| Highly cited | No |