Public Spending, Public Deficits and Government Coalitions

Bibliographic Data

ID6345288
AuthorsAndré Blais (0000-0003-4292-110X, Université de Montréal), Jiyoon Kim (0000-0001-6864-1531, Université de Montréal), Martial Foucault (0000-0001-6132-7160, Université de Montréal)
Year2010
Volume58
Issue5
Pages829-846
Publication date2010-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00842.x
OpenAlexW1836838334
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited31

This study examines the relationship between types of government and level of public spending. There are two competing perspectives about the consequences of coalition governments for the size of public expenditures. The most common argument is that government spending increases under coalition governments, compared with one-party governments. Another line of thought contends that coalition governments are often stalled in the status quo due to the veto power of each member. Our analysis of public spending in 33 parliamentary democracies between 1972 and 2000 confirms the latter argument that coalition governments have a status quo bias. We find, particularly, that single-party governments are apt to modify the budget according to the current fiscal condition, which enables them to increase or decrease spending more flexibly. By contrast, coalition governments find it difficult not only to decrease spending under difficult fiscal conditions but also to increase it even under a more favorable context, because each member of the coalition has a veto power

Argument (complex analysis · Coalition government · Context (archaeology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Government spending · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public economics · Public spending · Status quo · Status quo bias · Veto · Welfare · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization

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