Managing Chinese Bureaucrats

An Institutional Economics Perspective

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6345341
AutoresYasheng Huang (0000-0003-0183-6312, Harvard Business School, autor de correspondencia)
Año2002
Volumen50
Número1
Páginas61-79
Fecha de publicación2002-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9248.00359
OpenAlexW2040751254
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas74
Referencias citadas27

Conventional analysis of government typically focuses on ‘politics’, that is, interests, conflicts or personalities. But governing a country is not only a task of successfully governing its people but also an administrative task of managing subordinate officials. This is a very relevant issue in a country such as China, with a massive bureaucracy. The top ‘managers’ of the country – some 30 national leaders – make policies but also manage a large number of bureaucratic personnel. As in business organizations, control problems occur when subordinates have different interests from those of the organization and when the behavior of subordinates is imperfectly monitored. Control mechanisms are designed to minimize such problems by either aligning interests or improving information. This article uses this framework to explain a wide variety of administrative phenomena in Chinese government organizations

Bureaucracy · Business · China · Control (management · Economics · Government (linguistics · Management · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Task (project management · Variety (cybernetics · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Policies and Impacts · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration