Contesting Autocracy

Repression and Opposition Coordination in Venezuela

Bibliographic Data

ID6345372
AuthorsMichael Jimenez (0000-0002-8681-961X, Latin American Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume71
Issue1
Pages47-68
Publication date2023-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0032321721999975
OpenAlexW3165046629
LanguageEN
Citations received37
References cited37

Opposition coordination varies widely in electoral autocracies. Sometimes, opposition parties are highly coordinated and create alliances, present joint candidates or common policy platforms. Yet, at other times, oppositions choose to challenge incumbents individually. This article seeks to explain what drives opposition parties to coordinate in non-democratic regimes. It finds that opponents’ decision-making and strategy formation is influenced by the amount of repression they face from the incumbent regime. It argues that repression has a curvilinear relationship with opposition coordination. When repression is low and high, opposition coordination will be informal or clandestine. However, when repression is at intermediate levels, opposition parties will formally coordinate to dislodge authoritarian incumbents. This article illustrates this argument through an analysis of the Venezuelan opposition under Chavismo (1999–2018), combining 129 interviews with party elites, journalists, academics, and regime defectors, along with archival research at key historical moments

Authoritarianism · Autocracy · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Psychological repression · Sociology · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America

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Open DOIOpen Access