Pragmatism and Pluralism Revisited
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6349198 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Scott F Aikin (0000-0002-5358-7234, Vanderbilt University), Robert B Talisse (0000-0002-0599-3895, Vanderbilt University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 17-26 |
| Publication date | 2016-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1478-9299 • E-ISSN: 1478-9302 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1478929915607886 |
| OpenAlex | W2341158406 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 15 |
In 2005, we published a jointly authored article arguing that pragmatists must reject pluralism. As certain pragmatists describe themselves as pluralists, the essay received its share of criticism; however, no response has succeeded in defeating the essay’s argument. Nonetheless, contemporary classical pragmatists persist in embracing the term. Something’s amiss. In this article, we defend a conclusion that differs importantly from that of the 2005 paper. We will show that pragmatism is consistent with a view that we call modest epistemological pluralism. Thus, pragmatists can be pluralists. However, contemporary classicalists should beware. Our argument shows that pragmatism and pluralism are consistent, not that they are intrinsically allied. More importantly, the modest epistemological pluralism is not the pluralism that contemporary classicalists seem most eager to embrace. The argument proceeds in six steps. First, we dispense with a common but unacceptable conception of pluralism. Second, we identify what pluralism must assert. Third, we distinguish different varieties of pluralism. Fourth, we argue that pragmatists must reject all pluralisms except for what we term modest epistemological pluralism. Fifth, we discuss the prospects for pragmatist-friendly modest epistemological pluralism. Finally, we address the concern that modest epistemological pluralism is not practically distinguishable from monism
Argument (complex analysis · Criticism · Epistemology · Monism · Pluralism (philosophy · Political science · Pragmatism · Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Methodological potentials of using exploratory sequential mixed methods design for dark tourism decoloniality
Promises and pitfalls of environmental pragmatism
Pluralism and the Design of Autonomous Vehicles
Epistemology and social work
Pragmatism as a Research Paradigm and Its Implications for Social Work Research
The Philosophy of William James
A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy
Justice for Hedgehogs
The Pragmatism Reader
Democracy and Moral Conflict
The Concept of the Political
Why We Argue (And How We Should)
The Philosophy of William James
Naturalism without Mirrors
Civility, religious pluralism, and education
The Concept of the Political
| Citations per year | 0.63 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |