Constitutional Indifferentism and Republican Freedom
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6350598 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lars Vinx (0000-0003-0973-9613, Bilkent University, Ankara, TURKEY,, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 809-837 |
| Publication date | 2010-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0090-5917 • E-ISSN: 1552-7476 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0090591710378585 |
| OpenAlex | W2110664749 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 10 |
Neo-republicans claim that Hobbes’s constitutional indifferentism (the view that we have no profound reason to prefer one constitutional form over another) is driven exclusively by a reductive understanding of liberty as non-interference. This essay argues that constitutional indifferentism is grounded in an analysis of the institutional presuppositions of well-functioning government that does not depend on a conception of liberty as mere non-interference. Hence, indifferentism cannot be refuted simply by pointing out that non-domination is a distinctive ideal of freedom. This result does not suffice to defend the strong version of indifferentism put forward by Hobbes. But it does point to an important limitation of neo-republican constitutional theory: Neo-republicanism will amount to a distinctive paradigm of constitutional thought only if it is understood in a way that conflicts with Hobbes’s understanding of the institutional presuppositions of well-functioning government. It is doubtful that we have good reason to embrace neo-republicanism, so understood
Constitutional law · Constitutional theory · Epistemology · Government (linguistics · Ideal (ethics · Law and economics · Negative liberty · Political science · Politics · Presupposition · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,38 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |