The Politics of Transparent and Opaque Communities

Bibliographic Data

ID6355336
AuthorsGreg Hill (0000-0002-3022-3737, corresponding author)
Year1996
Volume29
Issue1
Pages1-26
Publication date1996-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolity (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2307/3235273
OpenAlexW2333349024
LanguageEN
Citations received4

This article offers a game-theoretic interpretation of the logic underlying Rousseau's contrast between the peaceful interaction that is possible when human intentions are transparent and the social strife that results when people become opaque to one another. The strategic implications of transparent and opaque intentions provide the context for an analysis of amour de soi games played by the rational egoists of standard game theory, amour-propre games played by "sophisticated" individuals who desire preeminence, and compassion games played by the guileless and trustworthy citizens of Rousseau's ideal republic. The article concludes with some Rousseauean lessons for the contemporary rational choice theorist, as well as a cautionary note for liberals who would reject the transparent public life of republican thought in favor of political arrangements that afford citizens greater privacy and anonymity

Anonymity · Context (archaeology · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Interpretation (philosophy · Law and economics · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Selfie · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Political Theory and Influence · Psychology · Rousseau and Enlightenment Thought · Social Psychology

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