The Effects of Non-Legislative Approaches to Redistricting on Competition in Congressional Elections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6355347 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James B Cottrill (0000-0002-8791-0781, Santa Clara University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 32-50 |
| Publication date | 2012-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Polity (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1057/pol.2011.14 |
| OpenAlex | W2030140899 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 7 |
Growing concern over gerrymandering has led some states to transfer redistricting responsibility from legislatures to commissions, boards, or other less overtly partisan bodies. These transfers in redistricting responsibility offer scholars an opportunity to study the impact of redistricting processes on elections. This study, focusing on congressional elections for the years 1982–2008, suggests that non-legislative methods of redistricting encouraged strong, well-financed challengers to step forward, and decreased the likelihood that incumbents would run unopposed. The data, however, do not show that non-legislative redistricting either reduced the typical margins of incumbents’ victories or increased the likelihood that incumbents would lose. In fact, the data sometimes run contrary to expectations. This raises questions about the common contention (especially by reformers) that non-legislative approaches (NLA) will promote turnover of elected officials. The benefits of non-legislative redistricting depend both on the types of outcomes that are desired, and on the specific NLA that is adopted
Competition (biology · Democracy · Economics · Gerrymandering · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Redistricting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors
Intermediate Conditions of Democratic Accountability
A Retrospective on Redistricting Practices and Electoral Competition in U.S. Elections
Is Gerrymandering Poisoning the Well of Democracy? Evaluating the Relationship between Redistricting and Citizens’ Attitudes
District Populations and Partisan Bias
Gerrymandering Incumbency
Do Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders
The Mask of Neutrality
A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting
Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86
The Marginals Never Vanished
The Vanishing Marginals, the Bandwagon, and the Mass Media
Strategic Voting and Legislative Redistricting Reform
A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies
Rethinking Redistricting
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,73 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |