Democracy and Dissatisfaction

Next article FreeEditor's NoteDemocracy and DissatisfactionCyrus Ernesto ZirakzadehCyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreAcross the globe, common citizens sign petitions, march through city streets, occupy buildings, support general strikes, and, if they can vote, elect representatives to draft laws. One sees examples of popular politics in Germany, Japan, and Egypt. Many of these collective actions are episodic and local. Almost all are prompted by dissatisfaction and frustration, over either social conditions or government behavior.The articles in this issue of Polity explore the channeling of people's grievances through political institutions and processes, and the dangers and promises of popular participation in politics.Katrina Gamble launches the conversation about democracy and dissatisfaction by looking at how members of the United States Congress articulate the concerns of a historically marginalized and socially disadvantaged population. She finds that African American legislators support policies that most African American citizens desire. But while doing so, these legislators eschew rhetoric that could be depicted as narrow advocacy for African American communities. In fact, during legislative mark-up sessions, they mention the needs and desires of African American constituencies less often than do legislators who are Democrats but who are not African American.Why the apparent avoidance of explicit references to African American communities when working with colleagues? Gamble offers a functionalist and tactical interpretation. She conjectures that to gain clout within the American political system, African American political leaders try to assuage fears and suspicions about their alleged dogmatism and special pleading. They gain political weight in Congress (and acquire key positions within the committee system) by acting as though their thinking is disconnected from local communities and constituencies. Gamble leaves the reader with a potentially troubling paradox: perhaps policymakers can best serve relatively powerless citizens by appearing to act autonomously of constituencies’ wishes. Stated more baldly, inside government circles, African American legislators may need to fake amnesia about racism in order to help African American voters.John Holzwarth momentarily turns our attention away from the surprising silence of elected leaders and focuses, instead, on the ability of people to act independently of leaders. He studies the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson because, Holzwarth argues, Emerson confronts head-on arguments by twentieth-century anti-democrats about the dangers of conformity and dogmatism among the masses, and about the inevitable differences in the innate intellectual abilities of people. According to Holzwarth, Emerson recognizes kernels of truths in such arguments and bemoans the failure of many people to reason for themselves about public matters, including interpersonal ethics. Nonetheless, Emerson also continually sees potential in all persons for “self reliance” (a complicated notion that, according to Holzwarth, includes an individual's capacity to assess competing values).Holzwarth contends that Emerson's insistence about humans’ potential for self-reliance is much more than an expression of private faith. It is rooted in provocative and often original views about the nature of ideas and about the origins of intellectual virtues. If we recall Emerson's line of reasoning (argues Holzwarth), we will realize how our dismissive judgments about people's capabilities rest on questionable premises about the nature of intellect, ideas, and virtue. Furthermore, if we take to heart Emerson's thoughts about epistemology, ontology, and developmental psychology, we will be prompted to contemplate social reforms, including changes in educational practices, that can lead to a more independent citizenry with unexpected depth of intellect and capacity for wise political judgments.Holzwarth's essay leaves the reader with hopes that rule by everyday people is possible and desirable despite current pressures toward conformity, dogmatism, and narrow-mindedness. Neil Andrew Englehart's article may make readers less certain about people's capacity for self-rule. He begins by contending that many writers today exaggerate the amount of harmony within civil society and neglect the amount of violence (or what he calls “predation”) that typically occurs between organized groups. Englehart at one point conjectures that scholars’ faith in civil society might be prompted by the atypical nature of the Eastern European transitions from single-party authoritarian rule. Perhaps this unwarranted extrapolation leads to a Pollyanna-ish faith that if authoritarian states are dismantled, a free and equal political system will spontaneously arise via habits and norms within civil society.Inspired by Immanuel Kant's writing and made circumspect by the history of Somalia, Englehart urges readers to be more skeptical about what can occur when a state becomes weak. The result need not be the spontaneous freedom and harmony that defenders of “regime change” often prognosticate. Adversarial and exploitative relations among organized social groups theoretically can occur (and historically have occurred). Englehart warns that the result of a political vacuum can be far more bloody and oppressive than advocates of democratization admit. In his opinion, strong states are needed, at least sometimes, to insure enough peace and protection for healthy social relations to evolve in countries with plural and clashing goals and interests.Unlike Englehart, Taylor Dark III is not interested in dampening social and political conflict. He is, instead, interested in contemporary scholars’ fear of organized partisanship in the United States. He notes that during the past two decades, many well-known scholars in the United States who advocate for social equality and economic justice have called for a dilution, if not an abandonment, of party-based politics. They argue that well-oiled party organizations help groups with right-wing agendas and hinder progressive groups. Dark finds the recent critique of strong parties with explicit ideologies puzzling. After all, a half-century ago many influential political scientists in the United States were advocating for more centralized, disciplined, and ideologically coherent parties as a method for increasing the rights of economically vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and for checking corporate power. Have past arguments by learned social scientists been found wanting in light of more recent historical experience? Dark says “no.” The reasons that scholars in the 1950s and 1960s gave for more responsible parties remain compelling today.In his opinion, most criticisms of the original responsible-party thesis rest on misunderstandings and a misreading of the original responsible-party argument. He therefore breaks down the argument into segments and assesses the persuasiveness of each step. He also reviews a series of policy decisions that have adversely affected working-class citizens. By means of doctrinal analysis and policy history, Dark defends strong parties as tools with which to check corporate power. He closes his article by inviting scholars who desire a more egalitarian America to recall the wisdom of earlier advocates of strong parties and to embrace partisanship, not shun it.In her review essay, Emily Zackin also looks at political history to reconsider an empirical claim that, for the moment, seems to have become undisputed among most students of U.S. politics. The claim is that the American political system has become dramatically more centralized since the New Deal, and that states today are little more than implementers for the federal government's goals. There is (many scholars argue) no longer a tug-of-war between rival centers of political power: the federal government purportedly hulks over a set of weaklings.Zackin reminds us that a few scholarly mavericks have advanced a counter argument. Furthermore, they have amassed data (in the form of both statistics and case studies) showing that states for many decades have cajoled and co-opted the federal government. Local interests subtly and routinely enter policy discussions at the federal level. Zackin advises scholars to study the tactics and incentives of state leaders and the goals of mid-level federal bureaucrats, and to note patterns of alliance building. This will give us a better sense of how policymaking really works in America and of how allegedly “weak” local groups, from environmentalists to promoters of regional commerce, in fact exercise power at the federal level.Zackin's essay, which ends this issue of Polity, echoes many insights and themes found in Gamble's opening essay about congressional committees. Both authors contend that the American political system is more institutionally oblique and more culturally complex than scholars tend to report. Older social divisions and conflicts of interest persist, even if political institutions shape how those divisions and conflicts are articulated and addressed.So, what is politics in America really like? The articles in the next issue of Polity will tackle that topic. Next article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Polity Volume 43, Number 3July 2011Democracy and Dissatisfaction The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2011.7 Views: 71Total views on this site Copyright © 2011, Northeastern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article

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