How Constitutional Law Rationalizes Racism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6356255 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sonu Bedi (Dartmouth Hospital, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 542-567 |
| Publication date | 2010-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Polity (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1057/pol.2010.13 |
| OpenAlex | W2070024630 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 3 |
In its constitutional jurisprudence on race, the United States Supreme Court subjects laws that explicitly invoke racial classifications to a very detailed judicial scrutiny. Race represents a red flag. I argue that constitutional law's use of strict scrutiny rests on a dangerous assumption, namely that racism may be rational. Requiring such scrutiny perversely errs on the side of deeming credible and sensible that which is already groundless and irrational. In turn, this higher scrutiny jeopardizes remedial legislation, legislation that seeks to ameliorate the effects of racism. Those who favor affirmative action needlessly place themselves in a constitutional bind. They accept higher scrutiny for racist laws—scrutiny that is unnecessary given the irrationality of racism—and then fight against it when championing remedial race-conscious legislation. They would do better to reject this scrutiny outright, leaving a rational review analysis to do the necessary distinguishing work
Constitutional law · Criminology · Law and economics · Political science · Racism · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |