Causes and Consequences
Responsibility in the Political Thought of Max Weber
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6356924 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nick O’donovan (0000-0002-0588-7734, Harvard University Press, corresponding author), Nick O''Donovan, Nick O'Donovan |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 84-105 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Polity (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1057/pol.2010.21 |
| OpenAlex | W2092390115 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 12 |
Many scholars view Max Weber's exposition of an “ethic of responsibility” in his 1919 lecture “Politik als Beruf” as a defense of pragmatic political action. This article re-examines Weber's argument in the context of his social scientific writings. It argues that Weber's political “ethic” is far more demanding than commentators have hitherto supposed. The conception of responsibility that emerges from Weber's work poses a serious challenge to the conventional modern equation of “acting responsibly” with “pursuing collectively desirable ends in an instrumentally rational fashion
Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Context (archaeology · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Exposition (narrative · Law and economics · Moral responsibility · Political action · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Weber, Simmel, Sociological Theory
Max Weber and German politics, 1890-1920
Science as a Vocation
Constitutional Caesarism
The rule of man over man
Politics as a Vocation
The problem of reference in Max Weber's theory of causal explanation
Max Weber's Reconceptualization of Freedom
The Many Max Webers
Weber's Inaugural Lecture and its Place in his Sociology
Rationality and Freedom
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,58 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |