Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan
Roots & Causes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6356951 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Minton F Goldman (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 384-403 |
| Publication date | 1984-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Polity (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3234556 |
| OpenAlex | W2322621237 |
| Language | EN |
The position that "sticks and stones will break my bones but words alone won't hurt me" may not have high moral standing, but it is surely one of the major considerations in many a government's international transactions. As Professor Goldman argues here, the Soviet Union felt free to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 because it expected no serious resistance-beyond words and symbols of disapproval-from the United States or any other concerned nation. In this context, the Soviet leaders may have thought that it would be foolish not to take the opportunity of gaining physical proximity to the Persian Gulf region with its vast oil resources, or not to bolster a new client regime in Kabul in danger of being overthrown by its domestic anticommunist opponents
Bolster · Context (archaeology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Intervention (counseling · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Resistance (ecology · Sociology · Soviet union · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Military History and Strategy · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|