Organized Labor and Party Reform
A Reassessment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6356961 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Taylor E Dark (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 497-520 |
| Publication date | 1996-06-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Polity (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3235343 |
| OpenAlex | W2161403632 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
The ability of labor leaders to act as power brokers in the nominating process was not destroyed by the Democratic Party reforms of the early 1970s, but by a prior internal fracturing of the labor movement. The AFL-CIO leadership could be power brokers only while there was consensus within the union movement on the main elements of domestic policy, foreign policy, and political strategy. This consensus broke down in the early 1970s, producing a crisis of representation that brought different leaders to the fore and a more complicated pattern of blue collar union political activity as some supported and others opposed party reform. Today interest groups can be effective in the nominating process only if they can mobilize their members behind a particular candidate early in the process. The difficulties of doing this have reinforced the candidate-centered character of presidential primaries
Democracy · Political economy · Political process · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidential system · Representation (politics · Sociology · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Public Administration
| Highly cited | No |
|---|