Accuracy and Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasting by the Administration, the CBO, and the Federal Reserve Board

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6356989
AutoresJohn P Frendreis (0000-0001-6026-3265), John Frendreis, Raymond Tatalovich (0000-0002-2670-0959)
Ano2000
Volume32
Fascículo4
Páginas623-632
Data de publicação2000-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolity (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2307/3235295
OpenAlexW2321939094
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas1

Short-term forecasts of nominal GNP/GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment by the administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Federal Reserve Board are compared for accuracy and for political bias. The most accurate forecasting is done by the CBO, with the Fed a close second. There is also a partisan bias at work within the administration, indicating that decision-makers internalize their policy fears by exaggerating the macroeconomic problem of concern to their core political constituency. Thus, Republican administrations over-forecast inflation and Democratic administrations over-forecast unemployment

Administration (probate law · Core (optical fiber · Democracy · Economic policy · Economics · Federal budget · Inflation (cosmology · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political science · Politics · Reagan administration · Unemployment · Work (physics · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact · Public Administration