Separate, Unequal, and Ignored? Interjurisdictional Competition and the Budgetary Choices of Poor and Affluent Municipalities

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6358971
AutoresBenedict S Jimenez (0000-0002-4184-7713, Northeastern University, autor correspondente)
Ano2014
Volume74
Fascículo2
Páginas246-257
Data de publicação2014-02-27
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPublic Administration Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/puar.12186
OpenAlexW3124087140
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas38
Referências citadas37

The fundamental value underlying the design of a fragmented system of local governance is consumer sovereignty. This system functions as a market‐like arrangement providing citizen‐consumers a choice of jurisdictions that offer different bundles of public services and taxes. However, the same choice also can facilitate class‐based population sorting, creating regions where fiscally wealthy jurisdictions coexist with impoverished ones. Some argue that the public market enhances the power of all consumers, whether poor or rich. Even if the poor are concentrated in some jurisdictions, they can exercise their voice to ensure that their government responds to their service needs. But does the voice of the poor matter as much as the voice of the rich in determining service levels in the local public market? Comparing the budgetary choices in poor and affluent municipalities, this article shows that in highly fragmented regions, some municipal services are provided the least in communities where they are needed the most

Business · Competition (biology · Corporate governance · Economics · Government (linguistics · Local government · Political science · Population · Public economics · Public service · Purchasing power · Service (business · Finance · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Marketing · Public Administration