Taxation by Citation? Exploring Local Governments’ Revenue Motive for Traffic Fines
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6364224 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Min Su (0000-0003-3772-1891, Louisiana State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 36-45 |
| Publication date | 2019-11-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/puar.13125 |
| OpenAlex | W2990371541 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 17 |
Anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments may have a revenue motive for traffic fines, beyond public safety concerns. Using California's county‐level data over a 12‐year period, this article shows that counties increased per capita traffic fines by 40 to 42 cents immediately after a 10 percentage point tax revenue loss in the previous year; however, these counties did not reduce traffic fines if they experienced a tax revenue increase in the previous year. This finding indicates that county governments probably view traffic fines as a revenue source to offset tax revenue loss, but not as a revenue stabilizer to manage revenue fluctuation. This article also finds that low‐income and Hispanic‐majority counties raised more traffic fines. Counties that generated more revenue from the hotel tax—a tax typically paid by travelers and visitors—raised more traffic fines, indicating a possible tax‐exporting behavior by shifting the traffic fine burden to nonlocal drivers
Business · Economics · Per capita · Public economics · Revenue · Tax revenue · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Finance · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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Costs and Consequences of Traffic Fines and Fees
The End of Speed Traps and Ticket Quotas
Redirecting revenues from law enforcement fines, forfeitures, and related fees to fund local nonprofits
Playing politics with traffic fines
Regressive revenue sourcing by local governments
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Does revenue‐motivated policing alter who receives traffic citations? Evidence from driver race and income in Indiana
Discretion in Traffic Stops
Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan
Understanding Institutional Diversity
Do Traffic Tickets Reduce Motor Vehicle Accidents? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Forcible Stops
Beyond Profiling
Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources
The Choice-Within-Constraints New Institutionalism and Implications for Sociology
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |