The Institutional Basis of Secessionist Politics

Federalism and Secession in the United States

Bibliographic Data

ID6374348
AuthorsLauren Anderson (0000-0001-5725-9329, corresponding author), L M Anderson
Year2004
Volume34
Issue2
Pages1-18
Publication date2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublius The Journal of Federalism (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-5950 • E-ISSN: 1747-7107
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a005025
OpenAlexW2031245205
LanguageEN
Citations received14

According to the literature on secession, the most important determinant of secessionist sentiment is a high level of grievance experienced by the would-be secessionist group. However, the rationale behind using secession (as opposed to another strategy) as a grievance-amelioration strategy remains almost completely unexplained. This article contends that the institutional setting in which political conflict and grievance are experienced plays a crucial role in whether secession is conceived of as a viable option. This contention is tested by examining the institutional environment of federalism and the role it played in secession in the United States in 1860 and 1861. The United States was uniquely vulnerable to secessionist pressures—as are all federal states, potentially—because of institutional structures that gave constituent states a high level of institutional authority and capacity; this, in turn, contributed to a discourse of states' rights that included the contested right to secede

Decentralization · Federalism · Grievance · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Secession · Sociology · State (computer science · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Political Theory and Influence

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub